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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from the conviction by the jury of the charge of Grand Theft by

Possession in violation ofidaho Codes §§18-2403(4) and 18-2407(1).
B.

Course of Proceedings
On or about March 23, 2010, Abraham Vargas was arrested in Cassia County, State of

Idaho and charged with Grand Theft by Possession. (R. pp. 2,16-19.) A Criminal Complaint was
filed on the same day, charging Abraham Vargas with felony Grand Theft, Idaho Code Sections
§§18-2403(4) and 18-2407. (R. pp. 2, 14-15.) Mr. Vargas was arraigned on March 24, 2010 and
a bond was set for $25,000 cash or surety. (R. p. 10.) A preliminary hearing was held on April
9, 2010 and Judge Rick Bollar granted the State a request for a continuance after presentation of
evidence. (R. pp. 42-43 .) An additional preliminary hearing was held on April 23, 2010 (R. pp.
48-49.) An information and an Order holding defendant to answer in District Court was filed on
or about April 26 and April 27, 2010. (R. pp. 51-54.) On or about May 18, 2010, Abraham
Vargas entered a plea of not guilty before the District Court.
On June 4, 2010, the Defendant filed his Motion for Jury Instructions in which he
requested to define value as follows:
"The market value of the property at the time and place of the crime, or if the market
value cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, value can be shown by any number of
measures including salvage value, replacement value, replacement cost, purchase price,
and the property's general use and purpose." (R. pp. 72-77.)
On July 21, 2010 a hearing was held regarding the Defendant's proposed jury
instructions. The District Judge did not make a detennination regarding the Defendant's
proposed jury instructions at this time. (R. pp. 97-99.)
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On July 26, 2010, the State submitted their proposed jury instructions and defined value
as follows:
"The market value of the property at the time and place of the crime, or if the market
value cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, the cost of replacement of the property within a
reasonable time after the crime." (R. p. 112.)
On July 29, 2010, ajury trial was held in which the jury found the Defendant guilty of
Grand Theft by Possession under Idaho Codes § §18-2403(4) and 18-2407(1 ). At the jury trial,
the District Judge adopted the jury instruction submitted by the State and defined value as "the
market value of the property at the time and place of the crime, or, if the market value cannot be
satisfactorily ascertained, the cost ofreplacement of the property within a reasonable time after
the crime." (R. p. 144.) A separate jury instruction advised that Grand Theft is theft of property
that exceeds $1,000. Any theft which is not grand theft is a2 Petit Theft. (R. p. 145.)
The Defendant was sentenced on October 12, 2010 (R. p. 155) and the Judgment of
Conviction was entered on the same day. The Defendant was sentenced to probation. (R. pp.
168-170.)
On November 12, 2010, the Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal. (R. pp. 176-178.)
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ISSUES
Vargas presents the following issues in Reply to the Brief of the Respondent:
1.

Did the state provide sufficient evidence that the Defendant, Abraham Vargas,
knowingly received, retained, concealed, obtained control over, possessed, or
disposed of stolen property worth more than $1,000 pursuant to Idaho Codes §§
18-2402(1 l)(a), 18-2402(1 l)(c) and 18-2407(2).

2.

Did the District Court en- in denying Abraham Vargas's Motion to submit jury
instructions regarding salvage value?
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ARGUMENT

I.
There Was Not Substantial Evidence Presented At Trial From Which The Jury Found Bevond a
Reasonable Doubt That Vargas Was Guiltv of Grand Theft By Possession of Stolen Property
A.

Introduction
The state failed to present sufficient evidence at trial to establish that the value of the pipe

possessed by Vargas exceeded $1,000 because the state did not present any evidence of a "market" which
would sustain a conclusion of "market value" in excess of $1,000 and provided no historical evidence of

an actual market price for used pipe.

B.

Standard of Review
A jury verdict will not be disturbed on appeal where there is substantial evidence upon

which a rational trier of fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of
proving the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Reyes, 121
Idaho 570,826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Hart, 112 Idaho 759, 761, 735 P.2d 1070,
1072 (Ct. App. 1987). In conducting this review the appellate court will not substitute its view
for that of the jury as to the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony,
or the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101,
822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991); Hart, 112 Idaho at 761, 735 P.2d at 1072. Moreover, the facts,
and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are construed in favor of upholding the jury's
verdict. State v. Hughes, 130 Idaho 698, 701, 946 P .2d 133 8, 141 (Ct. App. 1997); Hart, 112
Idaho at 761, 735 P .2d at 1072.
C.

The Evidence Presented to the Jury
Eric Staley owns an irrigation pump company, GJ Verti-Line Pumps, which installs and

repairs deep well turbine pumps for the agricultural community. (Tr., p.41, Ls. 8-14 ). His crew
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pulled out a pump "so that well work could be done on it" at a farm in Cassia County, Oakley
Idaho Crops. (Tr., p.42, Ls 2-20.) After pulling out the pipe, Mr. Staley's crew laid the pipe
pieces on the ground and then left the work site. Three days later, his crew returned to the work
site and a "bunch of the tubing shaft for the pump .... was missing." (Tr., p.42, Ls 17-24). This
pipe was later recovered at Santos Recycling (Tr. p.87, Ls. 18-19) and then placed back into the
ground.
The state charged the Defendant Abraham Vargas with Grand Theft by Possession; not
Grand Theft. Thus, the state did not introduce any evidence at trial that Vargas stole the pipe
from the field in Oakley, Idaho. The state only presented evidence that Vargas delivered the pipe
and shaft to Santos Recycling. Vargas also delivered on the same day aluminum and paper to
Santos Recycling. The pieces of pipe and shaft were extremely old and rusted and were accepted
by Santos Recycling for scrap metal. The total salvage value for all of the pieces of old pipe was
$332.52, (Tr., p. 101, Ls. 9-11), although Vargas is only on record for having delivered scrap
metal valued at $141.92. (Defendant's Exhibit A.) Despite the very low nominal value of the
pipe and the fact that it was extremely old and rusty and possibly radioactive, the state
nevertheless charged Vargas with grand theft on the basis that their expert Mr. Staley, valued the
pipe at more than $1,000.
According to Manuel Santos, owner of Santos Recycling, the Defendant, Abraham
Vargas delivered pipe to Santos recycling on two separate days. (Tr., p.96, Ls. 4-14). According
to the Recycling Logs, submitted and admitted as defendant's Exhibit A, (Tr., p. 102, Ls. 2-20),
Mr. Vargas's signature is only listed on March 20, 2011 for "unprep" aluminum valued at $95.85,
for paper valued at $178.00 and for scrap metal valued at $141.92. The total salvage value for
all of the pipe which is the subject of this appeal is $332.52. (Tr., p. 101, Ls. 9-11).
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At trial, Mr. Staley testified that new 10-foot tube and shaft sold for "somewhere around
530 some dollars ajoint, "or "more than $500 per 10-foot section." (Tr., p.51, Ls. 16-22.) The
two pieces of 10-inch column stolen would cost "a little over $600 ajoin1" if purchased new.
(Tr., p. 52, Ls. 15-20.) Mr. Staley further testified that he buys used material for 40 percent of its
new value, and then sells it for 60 percent of its new value, "so if the new value was $500, used
would be around $300." (Tr., p. 51, L.23-p.52, L.3; p. 57, L.16-p.59, L.22.) 1Mr. Staley testified
that about 19 pieces of 10 foot length pipe were missing. (Tr., p. 48. L. 1-3.)
Mr. Staley, at trial stated that he "probably" bought some used pipe within a year of the
trial date. He does not state what kind of pipe he bought or that he ever sold it. (Tr., p. 57. Ls.
10-11.)
Mr. Staley states that the market value fluctuates depending on what the supply and
demand is and that the market price is somewhat arbitrary. (Tr. p. 58, Ls. 9-11.) Mr. Staley also
admits that there is not a current market for used pipe. (Tr. p. 60, Ls. 2-5.)
D.

The State Failed to Present Substantial Evidence That The Fair Market Value Of The
Stolen Pipe Exceeded $1,000.
A theft is a felony if the value of the property taken exceeds $1,000. LC.§ 18-

2407(1)(b)(l). When the value of the property cannot be satisfactorily ascertained pursuant to
I.C. § 18-2402(11 )( a), then the property's value is deemed to be $1,000 or less. I.C. § 182402(11 )( c). See also, State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259,263,233 P.3d 190, 194 (Ct. App. 2010).
If the value of the property is $1,000 or less, than the defendant should only be found guilty of a
petit theft. I.C. § 18-2407(2).

1

It should be noted and made very clear that although Mr. Staley testifies that he buys at 40 percent of the new
value and sales at 60 percent of the new value, there was no evidence presented at trial that Mr. Staley has ever
actually bought used pipe at 40 percent of its value or that he has ever sold used pipe. He states he "probably"
bought some used pipe within a year of the trial date and also states that there is no used pipe to buy. He never
at any time provides proof of ever actually selling used pipe.
6

The market value should be based on pipes of comparable characteristics and quality to
that stolen. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 233 P.3d 190, 194 (Ct. App. 2010).
Under Johnson, the query presented on appeal is whether there was either (1) substantial
evidence that the market value of the pipes at the time and place of the theft exceed $1,000 or,
failing that, (2) substantial evidence that the market value cannot be satisfactorily ascertained,
together with substantial evidence of the cost or replacement pipe. Id.
The state contends that it has provided to the jury substantial evidence of the market
value of the pipe and therefore is not required to resort to replacement value or salvage value.
The state has not presented substantial evidence of market value because (1) the state's expert
admits that there is not a market for used pipe and (2) the state has not presented any evidence
beyond self serving speculation as to the actual market value of the pipe recovered in this case.
The state's expert, Mr. Staley testified that the market value for his pipes fluctuates
depending on what the supply and demand is and that the market price is somewhat arbitrary.
(Tr. p. 58, Ls. 9-11.) He further testified that there is not a current market for used pipe because
used pipe is not available because it is in the ground. (Tr. p. 60, Ls. 2-5.) He also testified, with
some hesitation, that he "probably" bought some used pipe within a year of the trial date. (Tr.
p.57, Ls. 4-9.). Despite his own admissions that there is not a market for used pipe, that the
prices will vary based on supply and demand, and that he has only maybe ever purchased used
pipe once in the last year before trial, he nevertheless testifies that "he buys used pipe for 40
percent of its new value and then sales it at 60 percent of its new value, so if the new value was
$500, used pipe would be around $300." (Tr., p. 51, L. 23-p.52, L.3; p. 57, L.16 - p.59, L.22.)
He defines new value as market value. (Tr., p. 57. L. 25, p. 58. Ls. 2-4.)
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According to the Respondent's Appeal Brief, to determine the market value of the stolen
pipe in this case, the prosecutor asked Mr. Staley:
Now, talking specifically about the material from this case, let's say Mr. Young had
recovered it, but.. .. after he had already installed new material so it was then excess and he
needed to sell it. Around that time, end of March 2010, would this material have gone for that
used price you just gave us." (Tr., p. 52, Ls. 4-11.)
Mr. Staley further testifies that "the value of the stuff has stayed pretty steady for the past
year and a half or so." (Tr., p. 58, Ls. 16-19).
These statements are completely self serving and without any foundation or historical
proof or precedent. It is impossible for Mr. Staley to testify that the old pipes in this case are
worth $300 a piece if he has never before sold pipe of this quality and character before.
Likewise, it is impossible for Mr. Staley to testify that "the value of this stuff has stayed pretty
steady for the past year and a half or so" if he has never before sold it, maybe only bought used
pipe once within the past year and there isn't even a market for it.
Mr. Staley's figure of a $300 value for each 10 foot piece of tube and shaft joint is not
supported by any historical or actual prices. He merely expresses a self serving preference about
what he would like to sell for. A market entails an arrangement where there a buyers and sellers.
A market price or market value is based on the quality of the material and on supply and demand
levels. The actual market and market price for new pipe is somewhat easy to determine because
there are buyers and sellers and one can point to specific prices in which these items are sold.
This is not the case with used, rusty and very old pipe. According to Mr. Staley, there might be
buyers, but there are no sellers of used pipe. This means there is not a market. Further, there is
absolutely no precedent or a specific historical price to look to in order to determine what the
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market for this type of used pipe might be. Mr. Staley testified that he probably bought some old
pipe within a year of the trial date. (Tr. p.57, Ls. 4-9.) He does not say what kind of pipe he
bought. He never testified that he has ever sold the type of pipe which is the subject of this
appeal and there is no evidence whatsoever that old or used pipe has ever been bought and sold
by Mr. Staley. It is therefore somewhat presumptuous of Mr. Staley to testify what the going
rate is for this type of used pipe, or what people are willing to pay for it. Mr. Staley admits this
when he states that his percentages are "somewhat arbitrary." (Tr. p. 58, Ls. 9-11.)
Further, even if it might possibly be assumed that there is a market for old or used pipe,
the state did not provide evidence that Mr. Staley's hypothetical pipe which is bought at 40
percent of the new value and sold at 60 percent of the new value is comparable to the pipe
recovered in this case. It is true that the pipe was recovered and placed back in the ground and is
therefore, according to Mr. Staley, "sufficient." However, a "sufficient" piece of pipe may vary
drastically from another piece of "sufficient" pipe and may not last as long. Mr. Staley assumes
that a radioactive piece of pipe is just as attractive as a non radioactive piece of pipe, or that a
pipe which is l year old is just as good as a pipe which is 60 years old, or that a shaft with holes
or weaknesses in it, is just as attractive as one that doesn't have holes in it. These attributes may
very well make a difference to a buyer and will be reflected in the actual price. The state has not
in this case made an apple to apple comparison between the actual pipe delivered as scrap metal
and the hypothetical pipe which sells at 60 percent of new value, or for approximately $300 for
each ten foot piece of pipe.
Naturally, the price, especially when dealing with a product which is several generations
old, should vary based on the character and quality of the pipe when sold. Thus, a blanket
estimate for any and all pieces of old pipe despite their condition, cannot be accurate. Mr. Staley
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appears not to care what condition the recovered pipe in this case might be in, because in every
case, he will buy at 40 percent of new value and sell at 60 percent of new value. He speaks

however for the consumer and he isn't buying. A consumer might care, and this might be
reflected in the price. At any rate, there is no historical evidence that a price of $300 is accurate
either for excellent used pipe or for very old, rusty and possibly radioactive pipe.
As the state has not presented any actual evidence of a market value of pipe similar in
character and quality to the pipe taken in this case, it has not therefore presented substantial
evidence that each piece of pipe is worth $300. Thus, under I.C. § 18-2402(11 )( a), the property's
value should be deemed less than $1,000 and the defendant should be found guilty of a
misdemeanor under I.C. § 18-2407(2).

II.
The District Court Erred When it Refused To Use Vargas' Proposed Jury Instruction On Salvage
Value

A.

Introduction
The District Court committed reversible error when it refused to instruct the jury using

Vargas' proposed jury instruction on Salvage Value. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 14-16.) Vargas'
request is critical because if the jury had been allowed to consider salvage value, it might have
decided that the combined pipe and shaft pieces were worth less than or equal to $1,000.
B.

Standard of Review
Because the propriety of a jury instruction is a question oflaw, the Court exercises free

review on appeal. State v. Avila, 137 Idaho 410, 414, 49 P.3d 1260, 1264 (Ct. App. 2002). For
the failure to give a jury instruction to be reversible error on appeal, the instructions as given
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must mislead the jury or prejudice the defendant. State v. Edney, 145 Idaho 694, 697, 183 P.3d
782, 785 (Ct. App. 2008).
C.

The District Court Committed Reversible Error By Refusing To Use Vargas' Proposed
Jury Instruction Related To Salvage Value.
A requested jury instruction must be given if: (1) it properly states the governing law; (2)

a reasonable view of at least some evidence would support the defendant's legal theory; (3) the
subject of the requested instruction is not addressed adequately by other jury instructions; and (4)
the requested instruction does not constitute an impern1issible comment as to the evidence. State
v. Edney, 145 Idaho 694, 697, 183 P.3d 782, 785 (Ct. App. 2008).
Vargas requested a jury instruction which would allow the jury to consider salvage value
by motion on June 4,2010, or about six months before trial. (R. pp. 72-77.) The defendant's
jury instruction by motion on June 4, 2010 is as follows:
"The term 'value' as used in these instructions means as follows:
"The market value of the property at the time and place of the crime, or, if the market
value cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, value can be shown by any number of
measures including salvage value, replacement cost, purchase price, and the property's
general use and purpose." (R. p. 77 .)
Additionally, the defendant requested twice during trial permission to provide an
instruction to the jury which would allow it to consider salvage value when determining value.
The district court first decided that an instruction regarding salvage value was not necessary
because the state had already met its burden regarding fair market value. (Tr., p. 83, Ls. 17-23.)
The court next denied any type of instruction regarding salvage value. (Tr., p. 167, Ls. 5-25.)
The Idaho Appeals Court has stated the following:
"Although salvage value may be admissible and relevant to determine the value of stolen
items, it is not ipso facto the market value of property that has been sold for scrap. As we
stated in State v. Hughes, 130 Idaho 698,703,946 P.2d 1338, 1343 (Ct. App. 1997), if
market value cannot be established, value can be shown by any number of measures other
than just salvage value including purchase price, replacement cost, and the property's
11

general use and purpose." State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259,263,233 P.3d 190, 194 (Ct.
App. 2010).
The Respondent mischaracterizes the law in Johnson when it states that salvage value
should only be used as an alternative measure of value "if market value cannot be established."
The court in Johnson states that "salvage value is not ipso facto the market value" and that if
market value cannot be established, "value can be shown by any number of measures other than

just salvage value." Johnson, 149 Idaho at 263,233 P.3d at 194. (Emphasis Added). Thus, the
Appeals court does not state that salvage value should never be considered ifthere is difficulty in
determining market value. To the contrary, the court states salvage value may be used to
determine market value; however, if market value cannot be established by salvage value alone,
value can be shown by any number of measures, other than just salvage value. There is
nothing in this statement which suggests that salvage value as a means of detennining value
should be excluded or denied from consideration by a jury, if market value cannot be established.
The Respondent also states that the district court decided that market value had not been
established and so an instruction regarding salvage value was not proper. The Court should not
be in the position of deciding if market value has been established. This is like the court
deciding if the defendant is guilty or not. The determination of value should be the prerogative
and duty of the jury, not the judge.
The requested jury instruction should have been given because (1) it properly stated the
law. The requested jury instruction by motion filed on June 4, 2010, quotes word for word the
language in State v. Johnson which is written in quotation marks above. See also (R. p. 77.) The
instruction should have been given because (2) a reasonable view of at least some of the
evidence supports a theory that the pipes were worth $332.52. (Tr., p. 101, Ls. 9-11 ), because
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this is what the defendant(s) actually received for the pipes and shaft for scrap metal.

2

The

instruction should also have been given because (3) the subject of the requested instruction is not
addressed adequately by other jury instructions because none of the other jury instructions allow
the jury to consider salvage value when making a determination of value.
A jury instruction regarding salvage value is extremely important because it instructs the
jury as to what it should be looking for. Salvage value may be argued in closing by the
defendant, but if it is not part of the jury instructions, the prosecutor may point directly to the
jury instructions which do not include any measurement of salvage value and simply state that
salvage value is not something the jury should consider based on the jury instructions.
The defendant was prejudiced because he was not allowed to present an instruction to the
jury regarding salvage value and the district court erred when it rejected the proposed jury
instruction.
CONCLUSION

The defendant respectfully asks this Court to reduce Vargas' judgment of conviction to a
misdemeanor, petit theft. If the Court decides not to reduce Vargas' judgment of conviction, the
defendant respectfully asks this court to allow a new trial.

DATED this 19th day of September, 2011.

2

The Defendant only actually received $141.92 for scrap metal. See Defendant's Exhibit A.
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